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According to reputational models of political economy, a term limit may change the behavior 
of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in 
a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977-2000, using government spending, social and 
welfare spending and deficit as policy choice variables using panel data estimation 
techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term-limited and 
non term-limited chief executives. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results 
based on U.S. states and international data. 
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1.  Introduction 
In  the  last  fifteen  years  a  lively  debate  on  term  limits  both  for  government  and 
parliament  has  taken  place  among  economists  and,  perhaps  even  more,  among  political 
science scholars. The issue was particularly hot in the 90s in the U.S, where the introduction 
of a term limits constitutional amendment for Congress members was brought to the floor 
twice  but  only  gained  a  simple,  not  the  required  two-thirds  majority.  A  number  of 
constitutional changes were taking place in Latin America meanwhile, where some countries 
introduced presidential term limits and other ones (such as Argentina and Brazil) changed 
their provision for their president’s office from one-term to two-term term limits. 
Though the advocates and detractors of term limits tend to consider their effects on 
policy making in general, it is on fiscal policy effects we want here to focus on. In fact, the 
Political Economy literature has highlighted that it is right in the field of fiscal policy that 
institutional arrangements usually make a difference. We also focus only on chief executives’ 
term limits. 
The empirical literature on the relationship between term limits and fiscal policy is not 
so extensive, and in almost all cases uses U.S. states data, with possibly only one exception 
(Johnson and Crain, 2004). Here  we conduct an empirical  investigation using two  recent 
databases: Drazen (2005) and Beck, Clark, Groff, Keefer and Walsh (2004). Our approach is 
based on regression analysis, which we enrich with some institutional as well as economic 
control variables in order to see whether their inclusion modifies the picture in a significant 
way. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the theoretical 
contributions of political scientists and economists on the relationship between term limits 
and fiscal policy; section 3 surveys recent empirical findings; section 4 briefly presents the 
data we use; section 4 illustrates the model used to investigate the effect of term limits on 
government spending and the relative regression results; section 5 investigates the effect of 
term limits on government deficit. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical literature on term limits: a survey 
There is a great variety of opinions about the opportunity of introducing term limits for 
offices responsible for economic policy, and this is true even if we consider fiscal policy only.  
In the Political Science literature the major recent contributions highlight the benefits of term 
limits stemming from their reducing average tenure: 
-  According to the so-called “logrolling hypothesis” (Reed et al., 1998), by reducing 
tenure, term limits reduce that special competence members of Parliament acquire with 
time of making agreements with other members so as to have their spending proposals 
passed, in  exchange for  the  same  (vote  trading).  Term  limits  should therefore  reduce 
public spending. 
-  Some models insist on the notion of elected representatives’ shirking (Dick and 
Lott, 1993). By “shirk” they mean deviating from the median voter’s preferences. By 
reducing tenure, term limits reduce the time incumbents may use to build entry barriers 
enabling  them  to  shirk  without  risking  no  re-election.  The  effect  on  fiscal  policy  is 
undetermined, as it depends on how the incumbent’s preferences differ from those of the 
median  voter.  However,  it  is  often  implicitly  understood  that  less  tenure  implies  less 
spending. 
However, some have shown that the relationship between term limits and average 
tenure is not necessarily the one assumed, especially in the case of two-term term limits. 
Others object that party discipline and the need to build a reputation to aspire to other political 
positions modify incentives in the same way term limits would, so their introduction would 
not make a great difference.     3 
Some  Political  Economy  models  consider  how  the  absence  of  the  prospect  of  re-
election may induce an incumbent to misrepresent the median voter’s preferences. Since the 
latter is often supposed to be fiscal conservative, this is translated in the proposition that a 
lame duck is likely to put less effort into keeping public spending or deficit down. Besley and 
Case (1995) build a model based on incomplete information about the incumbent’ type or 
about the state of the world, in which the re-election mechanism may raise effort. Politicians 
are characterized by some unobservable types wi, with probability pi associated with each 
type.  Once  in  power  they  make  an  unobservable  choice  a  (the  amount  of  effort)  which 
contributes to the success of policy making. Voters get the probabilistic payoffs r. The model 
is set up in two periods: in the first the incumbent chooses his action, and the outcome r is 
realized. Then voters make a re-election decision. The policy choice of the incumbent changes 
whether or not a term limit is binding. If there is a term limit the policy maker maximizes his 
immediate payoffs. If he can stand for re-election there is room for reputation building since 
he  can  have  utility  from  two  periods,  if  re-elected.  Therefore,  if  two  terms  are  allowed, 
incumbents who give higher first-term payoffs to voters are more likely to get re-elected. 
Those in their last term put less effort and give less payoffs to voters with respect to their first 
term in office, on average. 
In  the  Political  Economy  literature  the  term  limit  debate  sometimes  reflects  the 
controversial issue whether elections distort an otherwise optimal incumbent’s behavior or 
they  exert a disciplining effect on an otherwise biased conduct.  Smart  and Sturm (2006) 
reconcile the two views by considering that politicians may be either opportunistic (bad) or 
“public-spirited” (good). Their model, based on a signaling game, highlights that the prospect 
of no re-election in the second term has two effects: one on the last term’s policies, in which 
the incumbent chooses his most preferred ones, and one on the first term’s policies. In fact, a 
term  limit  after  the  next  elections  reduces the value  of  holding  office  for  an  incumbent, 
possibly inducing a truthfulness effect by which the incumbent adopts his preferred policy 
even in the first term.
1 The effect on voters’ welfare in the first term is ambiguous, but the 
truthfulness effect is associated to a selection effect which is always welfare-improving. In 
fact,  when  the  truthfulness  effect  is  at  work  voters’  strategy  in  equilibrium  reduces  the 
chances for both types of incumbent to be re-elected, but the reduction is stronger for the bad 
type. The quality of second term’s presidents is therefore, on average, better. The necessary 
conditions for this to be a equilibrium are a sufficiently low discount rate and a big difference 
in preferences of good and bad politicians (or in the relative size of their groups). Since there 
is no selection effect in case of one-term term limits, this institutional arrangement always 
yields a lower equilibrium payoff to voters. 
Notice that Smart and Sturm’s opinion about the effect of two-term term limits on first 
term’s policies is in sharp contrast to Besley and Case’s view: an incumbent does not care 
about  building  a  reputation  here.  The  testable  predictions  are  correspondingly  different.
2 
Alternatively, Smart and Sturm’s model may be read as an extension of Besley and Case’s 
clarifying  that  the  assumptions  under  which  term  limits  are  welfare  improving  are  rather 
narrow. 
Though not often cited with reference to the term limits debate, a number of political 
economy models based on games of perfect information (e.g., Persson and Svensson, 1989; 
Tabellini and Alesina, 1990) point to the distortionary effect of elections on incumbents’ 
determination of government debt when they are not sure they will be re-elected (including 
the case they are sure they will not). Originally conceived as models explaining fluctuations 
                                                
1 The discount rate must be sufficiently low for this to be an equilibrium. Notice that in case of no term limits, 
for the same value of the relevant parameters the perfect equilibrium is a pooling one, implying that elections 
have a disciplining role on bad incumbents but also a distortionary effect on good ones.   
2 The two models share the same preference for two term limits vis-à-vis one term ones instead.   4 
of government debt around the election dates, these models can be adapted to explain the 
difference of the debt policy of a non-term limited chief executive and of a lame duck. In the 
case of a lame duck the distortion goes in the direction of too much public debt issued: debt is 
in fact a means through which an incumbent extracts next term’s fiscal revenues and uses 
them according to his preferences. 
 
2. Empirical works on term limits 
Using data for 48 U.S. states from 1950 to 1986, Besley and Case (1995) estimate the 
effect  of  term  limits  on  taxes,  expenditures,  minimum  wage  and  workers’  compensation, 
controlling for variables such as state income per capita, the proportion of population between 
the ages of 5 and 17, the proportion of population above age 65, and state population, plus 
year- and country-dummies. The results show that there is a positive and significant effect of 
term limits on taxes and expenditure, and a significant negative effect on minimum wages. 
The effect on workers’ compensation is positive but not robust to different specifications of 
the model. In addition, these effects are mainly driven by incumbent Democrats.   
Besley and Case (2003) update their previous results using data from 1950-1997. They 
find  that  term-limited  governors  tend  to  significantly  increase  state  spending.  However, 
previous results concerning taxes are not replicated: per-capita taxes are insignificantly lower. 
It appears that the effect of term limits was significantly positive in the first half of the period, 
then it turned significantly negative (and with much higher dispersion) in the second half of 
the sample. No reason is given for this striking change. On the one hand, these results suggest 
that term limits distort policy choices; on the other hand, they do not allow any systematic 
expectation on the direction of the distortion. Possibly, a problem of omitted variables may be 
at work in this situation.  
Other papers have empirically analyzed the effect of term limits on fiscal variables for 
the US. Crain and Tollison (1993) find that a governor’s term limits have a positive and 
significant effect on budget deficits and revenues, but not on expenditures in the 1960-1989 
period.  Crain  and  Oakley  (1995)  analyze  differences  in  public  capital  stocks  and  flows 
between states with and without term limits. Using data for the Eighties they find that the 
stock of state government capital  per capita, the change in the stock, and  the  percentage 
change in the stock are lower in states without term limits. Recently, List and Sturm (2004) 
found  that  governors  in  the  last  term  of  office  spend  significantly  less  on  environmental 
protection. They use data covering the 1960-1999 period. However, the term limit effect is 
softened in states where a large fraction of citizens belong to environmental groups. Also, the 
term limit effect is smaller if the margin of majority in the gubernatorial race is larger.     
Johnson and Crain (2004) extend the empirical analysis of Besley and Case to a panel 
of 48 democracies over the period 1972-1990. Their results closely resemble those of Besley 
and Case (1995). A term limitation rule leads to both higher government expenditure and 
revenue. Furthermore, they look at possible different effects of a one- and two-term limit. It 
appears that executives subject to the former constraint are even more prone to engage in 
higher government expenditure and tax revenue. From a theoretical point of view, this may 
happen because the one-term limited chief executive cannot undertake any reputation building 
activity, since he can never stand in the following election. This finding is also consistent with 
the fact that term limits may either increase the volatility of fiscal policy or the overall size of 
the government, depending on the type of term limit. 
 
3. The data 
The central variable of our analysis is TL, which is equal to 1 when the current chief 
executive cannot run in the next elections because of a constitutional provision for the office. 
Our main source of information for the construction of TL is the MULTPL? variable in the   5 
Database  of  Political  Institutions  (DPI  henceforth;  Beck,  Keefer  and  Clarke,  2005),  a 
comprehensive  source  compiled  by  the  World  Bank  covering  the  1975-2003  period.  A 
preliminary inspection of this variable made us realize, however, that there was a mistake in 
the classification of the 1997 US observation, hence we made a complete check country by 
country
3 and made corrections. Appendix A goes into detail in the construction of TL and 
shows how it is distributed across countries (Table A) and time (Table B).  
Our first institutional control variable is MAJ, with value one every time the electoral 
rule is majoritarian.
4 Our source is Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
A less standard institutional control we consider is a proxy for numerical budget rules, 
named NUMRULE, which we constructed ourselves (in Appendix B there is a list of sources 
of information we used).
5 In the Nineties the number of countries that have adopted this 
device in order to foster sound fiscal policies has increased considerably. The most famous 
example is the group of 10 European countries bound to create the EMU, which through the 
Maastricht  Treaty  committed  to  deficit  discipline  from  1994  onwards.  Our  NUMRULE 
variable takes value 1 every time a numerical budget rule is adopted. Finally, to check for 
possible non-linearity in the effects of term limits, we interact TL with a dummy variable for 
new democracies (NEW). Brender and Drazen (2005) define a country as a new democracy as 
the first year in which the country receives a positive value in the POLITY scale, following a 
substantial period of negative values.  
Fiscal, economic and demographic control variables are taken from the country panel 
data by Brender and Drazen (2005), except for the series of government expenditure on social 
services and welfare (SSW), which we took from Persson and Tabellini (2003). Brender and 
Drazen define IMF-IFS fiscal data as very noisy, and exclude a number of countries from 
their analysis because of it. In their data appendix they also go in great detail in describing all 
the adjustments they made in the series of the countries in their dataset.
6 Their dataset spans 
from 1960 through 2000 (with very few data for 2001). In the end, our merged database 
covers 52 countries over the period 1975-2000.  
Appendix  B  gives  a  list  of  all  institutional  variables  we  use  and  details  on  their 
definitions. Table C reports summary statistics, and Table D means and standard deviations of 
fiscal variables in the TL = 1 and TL = 0 sub-samples. A look at the latter shows that the 
predictions of Besley and Case’s model are not so obviously true. Finally, Table E reports the 
correlations among the variables of this study.  
 
4.  Government expenditure and term limits. 
Our model specification is: 
 
t i t i t i t i t i Z P TL P , , 1 , , , e b a g + + + = - ,              (1) 
 
where P is the some measure of central government expenditure, TL is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the chief executive can (zero) or cannot stand (one) for re-election, Z is a 
                                                
3 Our main reference was Wikipedia, citing CIA Factbook for most countries.  
4 We also wanted  to  use a  dummy  for  presidential  vs. parliamentary  democracy,  but it turned  out  that  the 
collinearity between this variable and TL always made it impossible to obtain GMM estimates. 
5 We decided to consider only numerical rules because to our knowledge there is no worldwide index of both 
numerical and procedural budget rules tracking countries and their fiscal reforms over time.  
6 Preliminary work on Persson and Tabellini’s larger panel, constructed starting from the same source but not so 
meticulously elaborated, highlighted the problematic presence of many outliers. We found one fiscal outlier, 
Spain 1999, in Brender and Drazen’s dataset, too, so we deleted it from the dataset, since we believed it was 
probably the result of a typing mistake.   6 
set of economic, demographic and institutional control variables. Finally, e is the error term, 
and subscripts i and t represent countries and time, respectively. 
We consider two measures of central government spending: total expenditure (TEXP) 
and expenditure on social services and welfare (SSW), both divided by GDP. The former is 
more standard, data are available for a larger number of years and are said to be more reliable 
and  comparable  between  countries.  On  the  other  hand,  some  of  its  components  are  not 
dependent  on  the  actual  government’s  policy.  The  obvious  example  is  government  debt 
service, a considerably important item in many of the countries we consider after the rise of 
interest rates in the Eighties. SSW is a more focused type of measure. 
The dependent variable lagged one accounts for the status quo bias when it comes to 
determine next year’s spending.
7 Among demographic and economic control variables we 
consider:  
- YGAP,  log  difference  between  real  GDP  and  its  (country  specific)  trend  value, 
obtained using  the Hodrick-Prescott  filter.  This variable should  capture the change in 
spending due to the automatic stabilizers along the business cycle and Keynesian fine-
tuning;  
- proportion  of  population  over  age  65  (POP>65)  because  an  older  population 
requires higher spending in public provision of healthcare and pensions;   
- the  log  of  per-capita  GDP  (LGDP).  Wagner’s  Law  argues  that  government 
intervention is a normal good, thus its demand increases as long as income increases; 
- TRADE: openness to foreign trade lagged one year, defined as the sum of import and 
export over GDP. Increasing the size of the public sector is seen as a form of insurance 
against  external  shocks  by  countries  more  open  to  international  trade  (Rodrik,  1998). 
However, the sign of this variable is debated: when government spending is associated to 
higher taxation, this is detrimental to competitiveness (Tanzi, 2004).  
 
We  add  an  extra  economic  control  variable  when  estimating  total  government 
expenditure (TEXP): DEF(-1), i.e. deficit lagged one. There are two good reasons to believe 
this is an important determinant of the variable of interest:  
1.  TEXP includes also interest payments on government debt, and if the deficit 
was large last year, it is likely this caused an increase in the debt issued; 
2.  when the size of government debt is already big, a large deficit makes risk 
premia rise on government debt’s markets, which means a higher interest rate on newly 
issued debt, hence a larger average interest to be paid to investors.  
 
As for institutional control variables, MAJ has been selected because this electoral rule 
is associated with a smaller probability of coalition/minority governments, a feature likely to 
determine  a  common  pool  problem  (Weingast  et  al.,  1991,  Bawn  and  Rosenbluth,  2006, 
Persson et al., 2007).  We have also considered NUMRULE. Notice this dummy takes value 
one no matter the fiscal target of the rule. Most numerical rules focus on debt and deficit, 
being  those on expenditure a minority. However, reducing the deficit (debt) often means 
pressure for a reduction of expenditure, so that our expectation was that this variable did 
affect, directly or not, government spending.
8 
                                                
7 We have also tried to add lag two, but it always turned out to be insignificant. 
8 As pointed out by many, however, compliance has sometimes been a problem with numerical rules, and they 
also tend to induce creative accounting. Their effect on fiscal policy’s results must be assessed.   
 
Table 1: GMM Arellano Bond (1) estimates with TEXP as dependent variable, 1977-2000. 
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(0.0850) 
0.8934***    
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-0.0429***    
(0.0165) 
-0.0413**    
(0.0168) 
LGDP  0.24240 
(0.5730)                 
POP>65  -0.4173 
(0.2994)                 
TL  1.3195 
(1.2027) 
1.1319 
(1.1600)      1.1454 
(1.1698)      -0.4338     
(0.4344)    
-0.1146     
(0.5475) 
TL*NEW                0.9301**      
(0.4560)      
0.3029**      
(0.1571) 
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(0.5643)     
Countries 




















p-value  0.45  0.29  0.33  0.43  0.22  0.45  0.53  0.61  0.58 
 
 Our specification includes (at least) one lagged variable, and therefore only a dynamic 
panel estimation technique is sure to obtain consistent estimates. A natural candidate is GMM 
in its Arellano Bond one step version (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The features of our sample 
lead us to believe this is the right choice to make. In fact, Judson and Owen (1999) find that 
for unbalanced panels with a large N and a T smaller or equal to 20 Arellano Bond one step is 
the  consistent  estimator  with  the  smallest  distortion.
9  Our  choice  of  instruments  is  the 
following: all lags of the dependent variable starting from -2, one lag of TL and all control 
variables except deficit, for which we take lag 2. The Sargan’s tests all lead to the conclusion 
one should accept the null hypothesis of uncorrelation of the instruments with the errors.
10 
Let us come to the regression results. Table 1 to 3 show some results of the application 
of the general to specific approach when TEXP is the dependent variable. Table 1 considers 
the whole panel,
11 which is then split into two sub-periods: 1977-1987 and 1988-2000.
12 By 
considering  the  Eighties  and  the  Nineties  separately  we  wanted  to  test  the  existence  of 
different determinants of government size in the two decades. In every table equation (1) 
shows the regression results we started from, we then eliminated non significant variables 
progressively and tried with the inclusion of NUMRULE and MAJ. 
The two clear conclusions one can draw from Table 1 is that the driving force in the 
determination of government spending is its previous year’s value, while term limits have no 
effect at all. When all insignificant regressors, including TL, are eliminated from the model 
(equation (3)), last year’s deficit, output gap and trade play a role, too. Notice the signs and 
relative magnitude of last year’s deficit and of the output gap make sense, while TRADE has a 
negative estimated coefficient, which contradicts the insurance view. If we then introduce 
NUMRULE, however, it turns out that this is significant and has a strong effect, while TRADE 
is no longer significant. Adding MAJ turns out to be a bad idea, as it is always insignificant 
and affects the output gap’s significance. To consider possible differences between more and 
less established democracies, we use an interaction term between TL and the dummy variable 
NEW for new democracies, as defined by Brender and Drazen (2005). Results in columns (8) 
and (9) show that this variable is significantly positive, whereas TL remains insignificant. 
The consideration of the whole panel hides a deep difference in the determinants of 
government size in the two decades, as the comparison between Table 2 and Table 3 makes 
clear.  There  is  however  one  constant  feature:  TL  has  highly  insignificant  estimated 
coefficients.  
Up until 1988 trade is never significant, while deficit and output gap have highly 
significant coefficients and their absolute values are bigger than those shown in Table 1.
13 
This makes sense in economic terms, because many countries were engaged in expansionary 
fiscal policies after the second oil shock and later, after the interest rate rise of the early 
                                                
9 Judson and Owen also find that AB one step works better than AB two steps. Eviews’ manual states that there 
is evidence in the literature that the standard errors for the two step estimator may not be reliable. 
10 We have calculated the Sargan’s test using the J-statistics and instrument rank of the Arellano Bond step 2 
regression, which almost always resulted, as far as the values of the estimated coefficients are concerned, very 
similar to the AB step one result. In fact, the Sargan’s test is said to over-reject the null if constructed starting 
from AB1.   
11 The starting date is 1977 because 1975 is the first year of the TL series, Arellano Bond method implies a 
transformation in differences to do away with country effects and we take instruments in differences for all 
variables.   
12 The choice of 1988 as the breaking point was made for comparability reasons with the regression results with 
SSW as dependent variable. In fact, we have data on SSW only up until 1998. In order for the sub-samples to 
have both a sufficiently high T, we split the panel in two.  
13 When deficit and TL are in the same regression, the AB step 2 estimate covering the 1977-1987 sub-period is 
never performed by Eviews (possibly a collinearity problem). So we started from two distinct specifications: one 
with TL and one with DEF(-1), ending up with two different models: (3) and (4). Sometimes also POP>65, 
when both DEF(-1) and LGDP are absent, is significant at 10%.   2 
Eighties,  interest  payments  became  an  important  item  in  countries  characterized  by  high 
levels of government debt. A majoritarian electoral rule seems to have played an important 
role  in  mitigating  the  effects  of  these  phenomena  on  government  spending,
14  while 
NUMRULE is never significant.
15 
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DEF(-1)        0.4394*** 
(0.1161) 
0.4074*** 
(0.1089)     














TRADE  0.0206 
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POP>65  0.6952 
(0.8612)             
TL  1.0735 
(4.7291) 
1.1661 
(4.9047)          -0.5093 
(7.3072) 























test p-value  0.38  0.46  0.50  0.43  0.56  0.43  0.36 
 
 
In Table 3 previous year’s deficit and output gap are never significant, while openness 
is, though at 10%, when TL and other insignificant variables are eliminated. The estimated 
coefficients  for  TEXP  are  higher  than  those  in  Table  2.  MAJ  is  never  significant,  while 
NUMRULE  confirms  its  strong  impact,  but  only  in  regressions  in  which  POP>65  is 
included.
16 This result seems to confirm the view (Hallemberg and von Hagen, 1997) by 
which once budgetary rules are enforced, the type of electoral system no longer plays a role in 
fiscal policy determination. 
Let us now consider the regressions having SSW as dependent variable. Two features 
are similar to the above estimates: the dependent variable lagged once is always significant 
and large, while TL is never significant.  
Table 4 shows estimates on the whole sample, which now stops at 1998. When all 
insignificant regressors are eliminated from (1), SSW seems to depend on its lagged value, 
output gap, degree of openness (again with a negative sign) and the relative size of the elderly 
group (equation (3)), which is the first new feature with respect to Table (1). Actually, a 
second model also emerges, in which everything is about the same except for the fact that the 
output gap is not significant and POP>65 is substituted for by LGDP, which has a positive 
                                                
14 The significance of POP>65 is less clear-cut. It appears only when MAJ is included, it is always at 10% and it 
partially affects the significance of MAJ itself.  
15 NUMRULE takes value 1 for a very limited number of observations in this subsample. 
16 AB step 2 estimates give a coefficient with opposite sign for NUMRULE, which is not significant, while the 
rest of the estimated coefficients are quite similar to the AB step 1 estimates.   3 
sign.
17 The second new element with respect to Table 1 is the different significance of the 
alternative institutional control variables: NUMRULE does not seem to play a big role, while 
MAJ does. This may have to do with the fact that the panel stops here at an earlier date,
18 so 
that the relative weight of the first part of the sample is greater. New democracies do not tend 
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LGDP  -0.4864 
(1.4536)             
POP>65  0.6280 





(0.5155)   
TL  0.5130 
(0.6564) 
0.1993 
(0.6509)    0.0309 










































                                                
17 Results are available upon request. When POP>65 and LGDP are both in the same regression, they are never 
significant. 
18 In order to see how the different size of the panel affects the comparison between the results in Table 1 and 
Table 4 (as well as those in Table 3 and 6) we have re-run all the regressions in Table 1 (and 3) stopping at 1998. 
The results are available upon request.  Table 4: GMM Arellano Bond (1) estimates with SSW as dependent variable, 1977-1998. 
DEP. VAR. 
SSW  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 














0.7876***    
(0.0450) 
0.7856***    
(0.0458) 














-0.4945*     
(0.2714) 
-0.3597     
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-0.0204***   
(0.0064) 
-0.0162**   
(0.0065)     
LGDP  0.4106* 
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-0.0449     
(0.1481)      
TL  0.0531 
(0.2723 
0.1167 
(0.2920)    0.1304 
(0.2952)      0.3341 
(0.4880) 
0.3695     
(0.4390)     
0.5744     
(0.4294) 




-0.1901     
(0.1798)       
TL*NEW                -0.5066     
(0.5284)    
-0.8626*     
(0.5143) 
NUMRULE        -0.5203 
(0.5060) 
-0.5248 
(0.4710)        -0.9650**     
(0.3949)    
Countries 




















p-value  0.66  0.66  0.45  0.31  0.48  0.50  0.41  0.45  0.48 
 
  
Let us now turn to Table 5. The output gap is always significant, but here also TRADE 
is, with its usual negative sign. Again, there is evidence that a majoritarian electoral rule may 
have played an important role in the Eighties in keeping government spending down, but 
unlike  in  Table  2  LGDP  and  POP>65  are  not  significant  whenever  included  in  the 
specification. The significance of either LGDP or POP>65 considering the whole sample is 
therefore totally due to the spending decisions of the Nineties. 
Just like Table 3 was different from Table 2, Table 6 is different from Table 5. The 
most notable difference is again the significance of the output gap. The difference in the 
values for the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable is not so evident here, implying 
that government spending stickiness owes a lot to interests paid on government debt and 
capital expenditure. Just like in Table 4, two alternative models emerge from the general to 
specific process: one in which POP>65 emerges as a determinant of government spending 
and an alternative one in which LGDP plays a role.
19 Unlike in Table 4, but similarly to what 
we have seen in Table 3, numerical budget rules have a strong impact, while a majoritarian 
electoral rule was no longer relevant in the Nineties. 
 




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 










































LGDP  0.1555 
(0.5195)            0.1792 
(0.3400) 
POP>65  0.1240 
(0.2705)          0.1679 
(0.2418)   
TL  -0.6613 
(1.4839) 
-0.3962 
(1.2959)      -0.5238 
(1.6158)     
MAJ     



























0.47  0.46  0.44  0.46  0.67  0.43  0.42 
 
 
What  do  we  learn  about  term  limits  from  this  regression  analysis?  As  far  as 
government spending is concerned, they are irrelevant no matter the choice of the dependent 
variable and the time span considered. In fact, in none of the regressions we ran there was any 
sign of its significance. Our conclusion is that the size of government has nothing to do with 
term limits. The striking contrast with Johnson and Crain’s (2004) findings are not so much 
the consequence of the fact that they use a different sample of countries and do not consider 
                                                
19 Equations (2) to (7) with a switch between POP>65 and LGDP are available upon request. Notice that unlike 
in Table 4, where including MAJ would not make either variable insignificant (see equations (6) and (7)), here 
LGDP stays significant, though no longer at the same level, while POP>65 does not.    2 
the Nineties (even our first subsample excludes them). In our opinion, it is more related to the 
omission of the very significant lagged expenditure variable, their use of OLS FE and the fact 
that, quite strangely, their TL variable is not so similar to ours. 
 




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 














YGAP  -0.1807 
(0.1515)             














LGDP  0.0622 
(1.2867) 
1.2257*** 
(0.4107)    1.7153*** 




POP>65  0.8061** 
(0.3972)    0.3249** 
(0.1593)    0.4667*** 
(0.1439)     
TL  -2.6782 
(1.8614) 
-0.2433 
(0.1751)    -0.2528 
(0.1922)    -0.0990 
(0.1849)   












(0.5007)     
Countries 


















0.50  0.39  0.52  0.47  0.44  0.44  0.53 
 
 
5. Government deficit and term limits 
Moving to the relationship between term limits ad budget deficit, the results are close 
to the previous ones: TL is always not significantly different from zero, in the overall sample 
and in both sub-samples. 
In Table 7 we report the results for the whole period. In column (1) all variables are 
significant at the highest level (LGDP only at the 10% level), with the exception of TL. In 
particular, anti-cyclical fiscal policy, inertia in deficit and the share of the elderly are the most 
important  correlates  with  deficit.  In  column  (2),  including  MAJ  (which  is  insignificant) 
reduces the significance of TRADE, and makes LGDP non significantly different from zero. 
Adding NUMRULE in column (3), basically does not change the results. Finally, removing 
MAJ and LGDP makes NUMRULE significant at the 5% level, reducing the significance of 
YGAP. TRADE is significantly positive, causing an increase in deficit, whereas TRADE had a 
negative effect. We claim that reduction of taxes and government spending to attract capital 
inflows is not  balanced, therefore increasing  the budget deficit. The variable TL*NEW is 
significantly negative. The Sargan test does not enable us to reject the null of the validity of 
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Table 7: GMM Arellano Bond (1) estimates with DEF as dependent variable, 1977-2000. 
DEP. VAR.  




DEF(-1)  0.4437***    
(0.0709)      
0.5472***    
(0.0969) 
0.4037***    
(0.0687) 
0.444***    
(0.0661) 
0.2527***    
(0.0879) 
0.2377***    
(0.0879) 
YGAP  1.2282***     
(0.4160)      
1.7751**      
(0.5983) 
1.1558***     
(0.4318)      
1.1201**     
(0.4381)      
1.67945*     
(0.8786) 
2.6323***      
(1.004) 
TRADE  0.0745***   
(0.0229) 
0.0439*    
(0.0261) 
0.0586***   
(0.0239)      
0.0702***    
(0.0232) 
0.0897***    
(0.0214) 
0.0451*    
(0.0267) 
LGDP  0.48984*     
(0.2675) 
0.1100       
(0.8324) 
0.5195      
(0.6610)    0.6697**      
(0.3143) 
0.6996***      
(0.2157) 
POP>65  0.5798***      
(0.2050) 
0.3788**      
(0.1566) 
0.5477**      
(0.2085)      
0.6023**      
(0.2053) 




TL  -1.150      
(0.7261) 
0.0905      
(0.2501) 
-1.6119      
(1.0123)     






TL*NEW          -1.1132*      
(0.574) 
-1.0696**     
(0.4287) 
MAJ    -0.2781     
(0.5389) 
0.2857      
(0.4757)      0.2579**      
(0.1054) 
NUMRULE      -0.5386     
(0.3866) 





















test p-value  0.73   0.56  0.64  0.51  0.45  0.57 
 
 
Table 8: GMM Arellano Bond (1) estimates with DEF as dependent variable, 1977-1987. 
DEP. VAR. 
DEF  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
DEF(-1)  0.3993***     
(0.1104)      
0.4469***     
(0.1185)      
0.4459***     
(0.1183) 
0.3995***     
(0.1070)      
0.4320***    
(0.0747)      
YGAP  -0.3857      
(0.2874)     
-0.4492      
(0.3381)     
-0.4524      
(0.3379) 
-0.3583      
(0.3098)       
TRADE  0.0602    
(0.0358) 
0.0444    
(0.0375)      
0.0449    
(0.0376) 
0.0611*    
(0.0342) 
0.0692*    
(0.0375) 
LGDP  1.3319      
(2.0703)     
1.4043      
(3.3202) 
1.1640      
(3.3272)         
POP>65  0.4515*      
(0.2027) 
0.3861*      
0.1953      
0.3878**      
(0.1956)      
0.5318**      
(0.1930)      
0.5793***      
(0.2079)      
TL  -0.8465     
(0.5239) 
-1.6584      
(1.6953)    
-1.6802      
(1.6972)    
-0.7133    
(0.6882)     
-0.1536     
(0.4289) 
MAJ    0.0373     
(0.8803)    
0.0501     
(0.8797)        
NUMRULE      -0.8443**     
(0.4048)     
-0.2758     
(0.5695)    
-0.5377     
(0.3791)     
Countries 
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Table 8 considers the sub-period 1977-1988. The result concerning TL is confirmed, 
but in general, we observe fewer variables being significant. In particular, only the lagged 
value of the deficit and PROP>65 are always significant. Finally, Table 9 confirms, for the 
sub-period 1989-2000, the results of Table 7 in terms of poor significance of the estimates, 
showing only DEF(-1) and YGAP as consistently significant variables. For both sub-periods 
the Sargan test is within the acceptance area. 
 
Table 9: GMM Arellano Bond (1) estimates with DEF as dependent variable, 1988-2000. 
DEP. VAR. 
DEF  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
DEF(-1)  0.7355***    
(0.0848) 
0.6919***    
(0.0934) 
0.6778***    
(0.0943) 
0.7279***    
(0.0893) 
0.7057***    
(0.0811)    
YGAP  0.5516**      
(0.2328) 
0.5849***      
(0.2385) 
0.6591**      
(0.2909) 
0.4239**      
(0.2015)     
0.5127**      
(0.2324)      
TRADE  0.0387    
(0.0302) 
0.0429*    
(0.0259) 
0.0436*    
(0.0255) 
0.0438    
(0.0289)      
0.0439    
(0.0284) 
LGDP  -1.1944      
(4.8051) 
-2.0705      
(5.3910) 
-2.2957      
(5.5012)        
POP>65  -0.4746 
(1.7251) 
-0.2249      
(1.7830) 
-0.2273      
(1.8561)   
-0.6221      
(1.8414)   
TL  0.6989     
(0.5300) 
0.7635     
(0.6852) 
0.8181     
(0.6727)      
0.6539     
(0.5010)      
0.6454     
(0.4930)      
MAJ    -0.8248     
(0.5729) 
-0.7723     
(0.5891)         
NUMRULE      0.3413     
(0.5845)     
0.5708     
(0.6040)    
0.5667     
(0.5668)      
Countries 
















In this paper we analyze the effects of term limits on some fiscal variables in a panel 
of  52  countries.  Essentially,  regression  analysis  shows  that  term  limits  have  insignificant 
effects on both fiscal variables: government spending and deficit. Only in new democracies 
chief executives tend to behave with a systematic difference when they are term limited.    
This is in contrast with previous results obtained using U.S. states and international 
data. The U.S. states results are presumably largely driven by the peculiar features of their 
political system. In the U.S. elections are more centered on candidates’ personalities than their 
party affiliation, and party discipline is not as strong as in other countries, where a chief 
executive  whose  days  are  numbered  may  be  more  interested  in  securing  election  for  the 
candidate  of  his  own  party.  This  makes  a  difference  because  it  changes  an  incumbent’s 
incentives in his last mandate, and may be the reason why lame ducks are found to behave 
differently here and there.  
As for earlier results on international panels, the contrast is probably explained by the 
fact that we used a wider dataset, also including the 90s, and considered some institutional 
control variables. Our results stress the relevance of numerical budget rules on fiscal policy. 
Numerical  budget  rules  have  become  common  among  both  industrialized  and  developing 
countries since the Nineties. Since this was also a decade in which many countries adopted 
term  limits,  any  future  empirical  work  on  any  of  these  two  institutional  aspects  using 




Data appendix A: TL and countries in the sample 
In the DPI Database the MULTPL? variable is thus coded: 
·  .. stands for missing;  
·  NA means the chief executive does not have to stand for elections (dictatorships) 
·  MULTPL?=0 means term limited chief executives are in their last term  
·  MULTPL?=1 means term limited chief executives are not in their last term (also 
all prime ministers in parliamentarian systems get 1). 
The recoding we use is the following: NA is made equivalent to .. and MULTPL? = 0 (1) 
becomes TL = 1 (0) so that TL = 1 means presence of a lame duck. 
Before using MULTTPL? we corrected it for some mistakes it contained. In particular, we 
corrected the 1997-2000 US, the 1996-1999 Argentina and the 1999-2001 Brazil values. 











No. of obs. 
with TL=1  Number of obs. 
ARGENTINA  14  17  JAPAN  0  24 
AUSTRALIA  0  24  LUXEMBOURG  0  24 
AUSTRIA  0  24  MALAYSIA  0  24 
BELGIUM  0  24  MAURITIUS  0  24 
BOLIVIA  19  19  MEXICO  24  24 
BRAZIL  19  24  NEPAL  0  20 
CANADA  0  24  NETHERLANDS  0  24 
CHILE  10  20  NICARAGUA  0  19 
COLOMBIA  24  24  NORWAY  0  24 
COSTARICA  24  24  NZ  0  24 
CYPRUS  0  23  PAPUA  0  24 
DENMARK  0  24  PARAGUAY  0  24 
DOMINICAN  7  11  PERU  12  20 
ECUADOR  21  21  PHILIPINES  14  19 
EL SALVADOR  21  21  PORTUGAL  0  24 
FIJI  0  24  SPAIN  0  23 
FINLAND  0  24  SRI LANKA  0  24 
FRANCE  0  24  SWEDEN  0  24 
GERMANY  0  24  SWITZERLAND  0  24 
GREECE  0  24  TRINIDAD  0  24 
GUATEMALA  21  21  TURKEY  0  22 
HONDURAS  19  19  UK  0  24 
ICELAND  0  24  URUGUAY  24  24 
INDIA  0  24  US  8  24 
IRELAND  0  24  VENEZUELA  24  24 
ISRAEL  0  24  All  305  1183 
ITALY  0  24       
 
 
When a country has the same number in both columns (ex. Mexico), it has a one-term 
limit. When the number is the first column is positive but smaller than the one in the second 
column, it may either mean this is a country with a two-term term limit or a country in which 
there has been a switch from no term limit to either form of term limit (or vice versa). 
The first kind of switch seems to have been more common, as Table B reveals: 





YEAR  No. of obs. with TL=1   Number of obs. 
1977  7  41 
1978  7  43 
1979  7  43 
1980  9  44 
1981  9  45 
1982  10  47 
1983  11  49 
1984  12  50 
1985  13  50 
1986  14  50 
1987  15  51 
1988  15  51 
1989  14  51 
1990  14  51 
1991  15  51 
1992  15  51 
1993  14  51 
1994  14  52 
1995  14  52 
1996  15  52 
1997  15  52 
1998  15  52 
1999  16  52 
2000  15  52 
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Appendix B: economic and demographic control variables 
 
Central government spending as a percentage of GDP (TEXP), log difference between 
real GDP and its trend (YGAP), natural logarithm of per-capita GDP (LYP), TRADE - defined 
as the sum of import and export over GDP, percentage of the population aged 65 and more 
(PROP>65)  and  DEF,  the  difference  between  total  expenditure  and  grants  and  total 
expenditure divided by GDP, are taken from Brender and Drazen (2005). Central government 
expenditure consolidated in social services and welfare spending as a percentage of GDP 
(SSW), and the dummy variable for majoritarian voting rule (MAJ), are taken from Persson 
and Tabellini (2003). We constructed NUMRULE, the dummy taking value 1 if a numerical 
budget rule is adopted, using information in Filc and Scartascini (2006) and Balassone and 
Franco (2001). 
 
Table C – Summary statistics –whole sample 
  Variables used in regression analysis  Mean   S.D.  Min  Max 
TEXP  Central government expenditure (% of GDP)  27.3757  11.2023  8.5801  68.5800 
SSW  Social and welfare expenditure (% of GDP)  8.3739  6.5546  0.0190  24.5316 
YGAP  GDP gap  3.1232  1.7586  -2.3335  12.3305 
LGDP  Log of per-capita GDP  8.8116  0.9326  5.9135  10.8210 
TRADE  Openness (% of GDP)   65.0910  36.9951  8.8710  229.800 
PROP>65  Proportion of population aged above 65  8.6404  4.8493  2.1090  18.0710 
DEF  Central government deficit  -2.6819  4.0044  -28.571  15.0077 
TL  Term limits     0.2259  0.4182  0.0000  1.0000 
TL*NEW  Term limits*new democracies     0.1815  0.3854  0.0000  1.0000 
MAJ  Majoritarian system     0.2577             0.4374  0.0000  1.0000 
NUMRULE  Numerical budget rules  0.1048  0.30638  0.0000  1.0000 
 
 
Table D – Summary statistics – subsamples TL = 0 and TL = 1. 
  TL = 0  TL = 1 
  Mean   S.D.  Mean   S.D. 
TEXP  31.2058  10.6313  18.4317  5.7262 
SSW  9.9840  6.5102  4.4735  4.4750 
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Table E – Correlation matrix 
  TEXP  SSW  YGAP  LGDP  TRADE  PROP>65  DEF  TL  TL*NEW  MAJ  NUMRULE 
TEXP  1.0000       0.6531   -0.0280       0.3503       0.4159  0.5048      -0.3238      -0.5359      -0.4262     -0.0945  0.0522 
SSW    1.0000      0.0598       0.6914       0.2567  0.8549     -0.0711      -0.4348      -0.3634     -0.0330  0.3070 
YGAP      1.0000      0.0498      0.0633  -0.0417  0.0971      0.0459      0.0852      0.0705  0.1172 
LGDP        1.0000      0.0741  0.8237       0.1135      -0.3046      -0.2885     -0.0322  0.2662 
TRADE          1.0000  0.0839      0.0854      -0.3155      -0.3041      0.0535  0.0257 
PROP>65            1.0000  -0.0077  -0.5040      -0.4112     -0.0614  0.2889 
DEF              1.0000  0.1729      0.0673      0.0971  -0.0132 
TL                1.0000  0.8372     -0.0367  -0.0922 
TL*NEW                  1.0000  -0.0485  -0.0598 
MAJ                    1.0000  -0.1249 
NUMRULE                      1.0000 
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